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The Philosophy of Medicine Roundtable was created in order to promote
epistemological and ontological inquiry in medicine. Ethical questions about
medicine have received plentiful attention in the last 40 years, with societies,
journals, and meetings devoted to bioethics and health care ethics. Epistemological
and ontological questions about medicine have, until recently, only sporadically
attracted interest from philosophers of science. Notable landmarks include works by
Christopher Boorse [1], George Engel [2], Ronald Munson [3], Kenneth Schaffner
[4], Paul Thagard [5], Kay Toombs [6], Scott Sehon and Donald Stanley [7],
Richard Ashcroft [8], Aaron Cohen et al. [9], and John Worrall [10]. Topics of
concern include the definitions of diseases and health, the hierarchy of evidence in
evidence-based medicine, the nature of causality in medicine, and the challenges to
traditional biomedicine posed by narrative and phenomenological approaches. In
the last 6 years, interest in philosophy of medicine has greatly increased, with
several conferences, special journal issues, and edited anthologies on these topics.
Analytic and continental approaches to philosophy are both represented.
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The Philosophy of Medicine Roundtable is one of these new initiatives. It was
begun by Harold Kincaid at the Department of Philosophy of the University of
Alabama, Birmingham, who hosted Philosophy of Medicine Roundtables in 2004
(27 papers), 2005 (13 papers), and 2008 (19 papers). All of them were sponsored by
the UAB Center for Ethics and Values in the Sciences. From the 2004 conference
came the 2007 volume Establishing Medical Reality: Essays in the Metaphysics and
Epistemology of Biomedical Science [11].
European philosophers of medicine always had strong representation at the
University of Alabama at Birmingham meetings, and our next step was to hold a
Roundtable in Europe. Thanks to the hospitality of Erasmus University Rotterdam
and the Erasmus Institute for Philosophy and Economics, the first European
Roundtable took place in Rotterdam, the Netherlands, in October 2009. Julian Reiss
raised the funds, took care of local arrangements, and, together with Harold Kincaid,
Miriam Solomon, and David Teira, organized the program. There were four invited
lectures by Raffaella Campaner, Fred Gifford, Daniel Hausman, and Jan
Vandenbroucke and 14 additional presentations (out of a total of 30 submitted
abstracts). The next Philosophy of Medicine Roundtable is planned for sometime in
2011 or 2012. Jeremy Simon maintains an email list of over a hundred scholars
interested in philosophy of medicine, and a website for the Philosophy of Medicine
Roundtable (http://philosmed.org) is currently being constructed.
Other recent initiatives in philosophy of medicine include the highly successful
Progress in Medicine conference that was held at Bristol University in April 2010
and the forthcoming 16th volume of the Elsevier Handbook of Philosophy of
Science, which is being edited by Fred Gifford under the title Philosophy of
Medicine. Robyn Bluhm, Kirstin Borgerson, and Maya Goldenberg have also edited
two special issues of Perspectives in Biology and Medicine in 2005 and 2009 on
evidence-based medicine. And several contributed sessions on these topics were
held at recent conferences of the Philosophy of Science Association and the Society
for Philosophy of Science in Practice.
This compilation presents a sample of the papers presented in Rotterdam. Space
in the journal was limited, but we hope that the selection will give at least a glimpse
of some of the debates being conducted. We have selected two papers on causal
mechanisms (a currently popular topic in analytic philosophy of science), two
papers on Continental philosophical approaches to understanding patient experi-
ence, one paper on decision making in clinical trials, and one paper on the idea of
‘evolutionary medicine’.
In ‘Understanding Mechanisms in the Health Sciences’, Raffaella Campaner
analyses how causal mechanisms are hypothesized and tested in biomedical
research. There is a growing literature on mechanisms in different scientific fields
that Campaner assesses for applicability to medicine. She pays particular attention
to the Russo-Williamson thesis, according to which one should take into account
both mechanistic and probabilistic evidence in order to assess causal claims.
Campaner argues that it is important to distinguish between ‘evidence on
mechanisms that have already been disclosed, and evidence for mechanisms that
are currently unknown and to be discovered’. Evidence of the latter type is provided
by interventions designed to test the existence of hypothesised mechanisms.
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We currently do not have agreed upon guidelines for such interventions in
biomedical research, but, Campaner contends, they are called for and philosophers
of medicine should address them.
Brendan Clarke’s ‘Causation and Melanoma Classification’ is a discussion of the
consequences of our greater understanding of the aetiology of melanomas.
Particular genetic mutations that lead to melanomas (e.g., c-KIT and BRAF) can
now be identified, and it turns out that these mutations are more useful for prognosis
and treatment decisions than the traditional classification of melanomas in terms of
their morphology or site on the body. Clarke concludes that melanoma classification
should be based on the genetic aetiology of the tumour, interpreting it as a
mechanistic process as understood by Machamer, Darden, and Craver [12].
According to this approach, causal interventions on tumours reveal ‘features that are
stable across a range of background conditions’ and thereby are amenable to
therapeutic intervention.
Two papers make use of methodologies from continental philosophy to describe
patient experience. Havi Carel uses a phenomenological approach inspired by
Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger to show the incompleteness of standard biomedical
descriptions, and Leah McClimans and John Browne use hermeneutical consider-
ations from Hans-Georg Gadamer to challenge the possibility of standardization of
patient-reported outcome measures.
Carel argues that the phenomenology of the body in illness provides information
that is relevant to medical care. She develops some ideas from her recent book
Illness: The Cry of the Flesh [13] to create general epistemic tools for medical
training and clinical practice. She contends that we should take into account the first
person experience of the body, including its nonverbal manifestations (e.g., bodily
movement and gestures) in order to define illness. So-called ‘objective measure-
ments’ of well-being often do not correlate with phenomenological experiences, and
Carel argues that the phenomenological experiences should sometimes take priority.
Carel finds that phenomenological descriptions are helpful for addressing ethical as
well as medical questions about patient care.
McClimans and Browne take a look at patient-reported outcome measures
(PROMs). These are questionnaires that assess patients’ perceived quality of life or
perceived health status after a medical intervention. PROMs are increasingly
preferred for health technology evaluations. However, there is no standard form that
a PROM takes. McClimans and Browne’s paper, ‘Choosing a Patient-Reported
Outcome Measure’, suggests that the meaning of a patient’s report should be
interpreted according to the principles of Gadamerian hermeneutics. Instead of a
fixed and definite content, these responses are only interpretable in the context of a
particular understanding of the question and its circumstances. Nevertheless, the
authors insist on traditional standards for all PROMs: reliability (the consistency of
a measure) and validity (the extent to which a measure addresses the correct
construct). However, the authors argue that it is a matter of judgment when
determining which evidence is relevant for assessing any of these two properties.
Moreover, such judgments cannot be made a priori but require domain knowledge.
In ‘Statistical Decisions and the Interim Analyses of Clinical Trials’, Roger
Stanev analyses what he calls ‘hard-case clinical trials’: medical experiments in
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which ‘the severity of the condition being treated is high, the availability of
alternative treatments is lacking, or uncertainty about the clinical importance of
observed differences between treatments persists’. In such cases, there may be
ethical reasons to stop the trial earlier than planned. When facing such situations,
data monitoring committees have to make difficult choices, articulating ethical and
scientific principles into statistical decision rules. Stanev puts forward a very
detailed decision analytic framework for comparing these rules, which yields a
clearer understanding of the decision processes in hard-case clinical trials.
Finally, Pierre-Olivier Me´thot surveys the ‘Research Traditions and Evolutionary
Explanations in Medicine’, illustrating their differences with an analysis of disease.
Me´thot claims that a distinction should be made between a specific ‘Darwinian
medicine’ and a more general ‘evolutionary medicine’ regarding their respective
approaches to explanation. Darwinian medicine constructs ‘backward looking’
explanations, where adaptive explanations are sought for particular diseases in the
context of the environmental and social conditions of the Pleistocene era.
Evolutionary medicine adopts a broader and more ‘forward looking’ approach in
which explanations try ‘to predict the effects of ongoing evolutionary processes on
human health and disease in contemporary environments (e.g., hospitals)’. Me´thot
explores at length the scope and practical implications of each of these two research
agendas.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
Noncommercial License which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any
medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
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